mcp-server
Provides a local Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for the Perses application, allowing MCP-capable LLM hosts to manage Perses resources (projects, dashboards, datasources, roles, variables, plugins). Supports stdio (local) and HTTP (remote/shared) transports and can run in read-only mode.
Score Breakdown
⚙ Agent Friendliness
🔒 Security
The README provides guidance to pass sensitive values via environment variables and supports TLS configuration for the Perses server connection (tls_config with ca_file and insecure_skip_verify). However, the documentation provided does not describe MCP-side auth, encryption requirements for HTTP transport, rotation, or security headers; also no mention of fine-grained scopes for MCP tool access. Dependency hygiene and version/security patching are not assessable from the provided data.
⚡ Reliability
Best When
You have a Perses instance running and an MCP-capable host (e.g., Claude Desktop, VS Code, Cursor, OpenCode) and you want tool-based automation of Perses resource management.
Avoid When
You cannot adequately protect credentials/tokens used to reach Perses, or you cannot secure any HTTP transport exposure to the MCP server and Perses backend.
Use Cases
- • Connect an MCP-capable desktop IDE/client to a local Perses instance for reading and optionally writing Perses configuration/resources.
- • Enable standardized LLM-tool access to Perses dashboards, datasources, role bindings, and variables via MCP.
- • Share a single Perses-backed MCP endpoint to multiple clients using HTTP transport.
Not For
- • Production-grade multi-tenant exposure of Perses without careful network hardening (the MCP server is described as a local server; HTTP mode should be secured externally).
- • Use as a generic Perses API client outside MCP contexts (it is primarily an MCP server wrapper).
- • Environments that require strict, externally verifiable reliability/SLA claims (documentation does not provide these).
Interface
Authentication
Auth is configured for the MCP server to authenticate to the Perses instance. Documentation describes Basic auth and Bearer token; it does not mention OAuth scopes or fine-grained MCP-level scopes.
Pricing
This is a self-hosted MCP server component; no pricing is described.
Agent Metadata
Known Gotchas
- ⚠ When running with read_only=true, write tools are disabled; agents attempting create/update operations should expect failures.
- ⚠ If using HTTP transport, ensure the MCP server and underlying Perses server are properly secured (documentation does not describe auth/allowlisting at the MCP transport layer beyond proxying Perses auth).
Alternatives
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Scores are editorial opinions as of 2026-03-30.