{"id":"sceptre-mcp-server","name":"sceptre-mcp-server","homepage":"https://pypi.org/project/sceptre-mcp-server/","repo_url":"https://github.com/Sceptre/sceptre-mcp-server","category":"infrastructure","subcategories":[],"tags":["ai-ml","devops","infrastructure","aws","cloudformation","sceptre","mcp","tooling"],"what_it_does":"Provides a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that exposes Sceptre CloudFormation management capabilities (stack lifecycle, querying, template rendering/validation, diff & drift, change sets, and project discovery) as MCP tools for AI agents.","use_cases":["AI-assisted CloudFormation stack management via Sceptre (create/update/delete/launch)","Automated investigation of stack state (status, resources, events, outputs)","Generating and validating CloudFormation templates from Sceptre config","Detecting configuration drift and showing diffs vs deployed state","Orchestrating change sets (create/describe/list/execute/delete)","Discovering stacks and dumping resolved Sceptre configuration for planning/auditing"],"not_for":["Production environments that require strict approval gates for destructive operations without additional controls","Use cases that need a hosted HTTP API/SDK instead of a local MCP server process","Environments where agents should not be allowed to execute AWS operations (create/update/delete/execute change sets)"],"best_when":"You want an agent to call well-scoped MCP tools to manage AWS CloudFormation stacks through Sceptre in an environment where AWS credentials/permissions are already controlled.","avoid_when":"You cannot tightly restrict agent permissions (AWS IAM) and MCP tool usage—this tool can drive powerful AWS actions (including deletes and executing change sets).","alternatives":["Use Sceptre directly (CLI or Python API) from your automation layer rather than an MCP server","Build a thin internal service exposing only a restricted subset of actions with strong approval workflows","Use AWS SDK/CLI plus custom tooling (describe/diff/change set orchestration) instead of Sceptre MCP integration","Adopt an existing MCP connector (if available) for AWS/CDK/CloudFormation with narrower scopes"],"af_score":57.2,"security_score":45.2,"reliability_score":23.8,"package_type":"mcp_server","discovery_source":["pypi"],"priority":"low","status":"evaluated","version_evaluated":null,"last_evaluated":"2026-04-04T21:45:21.848893+00:00","interface":{"has_rest_api":false,"has_graphql":false,"has_grpc":false,"has_mcp_server":true,"mcp_server_url":null,"has_sdk":false,"sdk_languages":[],"openapi_spec_url":null,"webhooks":false},"auth":{"methods":["AWS credential chain via environment variables (e.g., AWS_PROFILE, AWS_DEFAULT_REGION) and standard AWS auth mechanisms"],"oauth":false,"scopes":false,"notes":"Authentication is delegated to AWS credentials resolution (standard AWS credential chain) rather than an MCP-layer auth/authorization mechanism in the provided README."},"pricing":{"model":null,"free_tier_exists":false,"free_tier_limits":null,"paid_tiers":[],"requires_credit_card":false,"estimated_workload_costs":null,"notes":"No pricing details provided; as a Python package, cost is primarily AWS API usage/CloudFormation operations plus any agent host runtime."},"requirements":{"requires_signup":false,"requires_credit_card":false,"domain_verification":false,"data_residency":[],"compliance":[],"min_contract":null},"agent_readiness":{"af_score":57.2,"security_score":45.2,"reliability_score":23.8,"mcp_server_quality":78.0,"documentation_accuracy":82.0,"error_message_quality":0.0,"error_message_notes":null,"auth_complexity":65.0,"rate_limit_clarity":0.0,"tls_enforcement":40.0,"auth_strength":60.0,"scope_granularity":20.0,"dependency_hygiene":55.0,"secret_handling":50.0,"security_notes":"Security is largely inherited from AWS IAM and the deployment environment. The MCP server itself appears to be a local/agent-invoked process; the README does not specify transport/TLS controls, MCP authentication, audit logging, or fine-grained tool authorization. Because it can execute impactful AWS operations, the primary risk is over-permissioning IAM or lacking agent-side approval/guardrails.","uptime_documented":0.0,"version_stability":45.0,"breaking_changes_history":20.0,"error_recovery":30.0,"idempotency_support":"false","idempotency_notes":"No idempotency guarantees stated. Some operations are inherently non-idempotent (e.g., create/update stacks, execute change sets).","pagination_style":"none","retry_guidance_documented":false,"known_agent_gotchas":["Destructive actions are available (delete_stack, delete_change_set, execute_change_set) and may be triggered by the agent unless you enforce approval/guardrails in the MCP client/agent workflow.","Many operations depend on local Sceptre project structure (config/ and templates/ dirs) and correct stack_path values relative to config/.","AWS operations may take time asynchronously; agent/tool workflows must account for eventual consistency and stack transitions (e.g., waiting for completion is not described).","AWS permissions are enforced by IAM; mis-scoped credentials will cause failures that the agent may need to interpret."]}}