{"id":"masx200-docker-mcp-server","name":"docker_mcp_server","af_score":51.0,"security_score":35.0,"reliability_score":18.8,"what_it_does":"Provides an MCP server that exposes Docker operations as Model Context Protocol (MCP) tools via an HTTP/SSE/WebSocket bridge. It connects to a Docker daemon (optionally over TLS) and uses MCP Mediator to generate MCP tools for Docker client service methods, including many container/image/swarm/network/volume/registry operations.","best_when":"Used locally or inside a tightly controlled environment (dev machine, dedicated build agent, internal network) with limited exposure, where operators can trust the agent and its prompts.","avoid_when":"Avoid exposing endpoints to the public internet or any broad audience; avoid using with weak/no TLS between components where traffic could be intercepted; avoid if you cannot sandbox/limit the Docker daemon permissions available to the service.","last_evaluated":"2026-04-04T20:03:10.950849+00:00","has_mcp":true,"has_api":true,"auth_methods":["No first-class auth described for the MCP bridge endpoints (only Docker daemon connectivity options).","Docker registry authentication is supported as a Docker command/tool (docker_authenticate), which implies registry credentials are needed for that tool."],"has_free_tier":false,"known_gotchas":["The MCP tools include destructive operations (remove containers/images/services, prune, leave swarm, etc.); an agent needs strong guardrails/confirmation logic.","If the Docker daemon is reachable via mounted docker.sock or exposed TCP, the MCP server effectively becomes a powerful remote-control surface.","Non-annotated method tool generation is supported, and tool naming/descriptions may be inferred—agents should still validate tool semantics and expected parameters.","Tool behavior depends on the permissions of the Docker daemon identity used by the server; failures may surface as Docker API errors without documented MCP-specific remediation."],"error_quality":0.0}