{"id":"itz4blitz-jmx-mcp","name":"JMX-MCP","homepage":null,"repo_url":"https://github.com/itz4blitz/JMX-MCP","category":"infrastructure","subcategories":[],"tags":["ai-assistant","mcp","java","jmx","mbeans","monitoring","observability","spring-boot","stdio-transport","json-rpc-2.0"],"what_it_does":"JMX-MCP is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that exposes Java Management Extensions (JMX) data and operations to MCP clients (e.g., Claude Desktop) via JSON-RPC 2.0, using STDIO transport. It discovers MBeans, exposes JMX attributes as discoverable MCP resources, and provides MCP tools for listing domains/beans, reading/writing attributes, and managing JMX connections.","use_cases":["Monitoring JVM health (heap/non-heap usage, GC stats, threads) through an AI assistant","Discovering and browsing available MBeans/domains and specific attributes","Reading JMX attributes on demand (e.g., Runtime uptime)","Writing selected, allowed MBean attributes for operational changes (e.g., log levels)","Managing multiple JMX connections (add/remove/switch; connection health/status)","Integrating AI assistants with Java app telemetry and lightweight operational control"],"not_for":["Internet-facing remote JMX management without strong network and auth controls","Highly regulated environments that require explicit compliance evidence not provided in the README","Full application lifecycle operations (restart/shutdown) unless explicitly and safely permitted and auditable","Automated high-risk operations where agent-driven invocation could cause outages"],"best_when":"You need local or controlled environment JMX observability and limited, policy-restricted management actions accessible to an MCP-capable AI client over STDIO.","avoid_when":"You need robust enterprise security guarantees (strong auth/TLS, auditability, and formal security posture) suitable for untrusted or internet-facing access; the README does not provide enough detail to ensure that level of safety.","alternatives":["General JMX tooling (jmxterm, Jolokia) with dashboards (Prometheus/Grafana)","MCP servers built on top of Jolokia/Prometheus exporters","Custom MCP server integrating JMX through your own hardened policy layer","Spring Boot Actuator endpoints for common metrics/health (where applicable)"],"af_score":61.2,"security_score":47.2,"reliability_score":33.8,"package_type":"mcp_server","discovery_source":["github"],"priority":"low","status":"evaluated","version_evaluated":null,"last_evaluated":"2026-04-04T19:33:24.662135+00:00","interface":{"has_rest_api":false,"has_graphql":false,"has_grpc":false,"has_mcp_server":true,"mcp_server_url":null,"has_sdk":false,"sdk_languages":[],"openapi_spec_url":null,"webhooks":false},"auth":{"methods":["Configurable JMX connection handling","ObjectName and operation allow/deny validation (policy-based)"],"oauth":false,"scopes":false,"notes":"Authentication/authorization is described as built-in security validation (object name validation, operation filtering, access control policies), but no concrete auth mechanism (e.g., API keys/OAuth) is described in the README."},"pricing":{"model":null,"free_tier_exists":false,"free_tier_limits":null,"paid_tiers":[],"requires_credit_card":false,"estimated_workload_costs":null,"notes":"Open-source (MIT). No pricing model described."},"requirements":{"requires_signup":false,"requires_credit_card":false,"domain_verification":false,"data_residency":[],"compliance":[],"min_contract":null},"agent_readiness":{"af_score":61.2,"security_score":47.2,"reliability_score":33.8,"mcp_server_quality":85.0,"documentation_accuracy":75.0,"error_message_quality":0.0,"error_message_notes":null,"auth_complexity":55.0,"rate_limit_clarity":10.0,"tls_enforcement":20.0,"auth_strength":55.0,"scope_granularity":70.0,"dependency_hygiene":50.0,"secret_handling":40.0,"security_notes":"README mentions security controls: object-name validation, operation filtering (e.g., blocks shutdown/restart), type safety for attributes, and configurable access control policies. However, it does not describe transport security (TLS) because the primary integration is STDIO, nor does it specify authentication mechanisms for untrusted clients, credential handling for remote JMX, logging redaction, or audit trails. Treat it as requiring careful network/policy containment when used with remote JMX targets.","uptime_documented":0.0,"version_stability":45.0,"breaking_changes_history":20.0,"error_recovery":70.0,"idempotency_support":"false","idempotency_notes":null,"pagination_style":"none","retry_guidance_documented":false,"known_agent_gotchas":["Agent-driven tool calls could attempt to access or mutate MBeans; the server includes filtering but the exact policy defaults are not fully specified in the README.","MCP resources expose many JMX attributes; agents may need guardrails to avoid excessive browsing/reads that could increase load.","Operations like setAttribute may have side effects; ensure blocked/dangerous operations are configured and validated before granting tool access."]}}