{"id":"gofmanaa-turret-mcp-server","name":"turret_mcp_server","homepage":null,"repo_url":"https://github.com/gofmanaa/turret_mcp_server","category":"automation","subcategories":[],"tags":["mcp","iot","robotics","hardware-control","serial","rust","actuation"],"what_it_does":"An MCP server (Rust) that controls a physical turret via serial communication, exposing MCP tools to fire, set pan/tilt position, and query bullet count (plus an echo tool).","use_cases":["Robot/embedded projects needing LLM-to-device control over MCP","Demo environments or labs where an agent can command a turret (pan/tilt + fire)","Integration testing of agent tool calling with a serial-controlled actuator"],"not_for":["Production deployments without hardware safety controls","Untrusted/public network exposure of a fire-capable tool","Environments where the serial device path/permissions or safety interlocks cannot be secured"],"best_when":"Used in an air-gapped or tightly controlled environment with a trusted MCP client and verified serial hardware configuration.","avoid_when":"Avoid exposing the server broadly, and avoid automated firing without rate/safety limits and operator confirmation.","alternatives":["Direct hardware control via a dedicated robotics controller/SDK","A REST/GraphQL gateway wrapping serial control with explicit safety gating","Open-source robot middleware (e.g., ROS2) with constrained action interfaces"],"af_score":38.8,"security_score":30.8,"reliability_score":30.0,"package_type":"mcp_server","discovery_source":["github"],"priority":"low","status":"evaluated","version_evaluated":null,"last_evaluated":"2026-04-04T19:34:51.513491+00:00","interface":{"has_rest_api":false,"has_graphql":false,"has_grpc":false,"has_mcp_server":true,"mcp_server_url":null,"has_sdk":false,"sdk_languages":[],"openapi_spec_url":null,"webhooks":false},"auth":{"methods":[],"oauth":false,"scopes":false,"notes":"README shows MCP server configuration for an MCP client but does not describe any authentication/authorization model for the MCP server itself."},"pricing":{"model":null,"free_tier_exists":false,"free_tier_limits":null,"paid_tiers":[],"requires_credit_card":false,"estimated_workload_costs":null,"notes":null},"requirements":{"requires_signup":false,"requires_credit_card":false,"domain_verification":false,"data_residency":[],"compliance":[],"min_contract":null},"agent_readiness":{"af_score":38.8,"security_score":30.8,"reliability_score":30.0,"mcp_server_quality":70.0,"documentation_accuracy":65.0,"error_message_quality":0.0,"error_message_notes":null,"auth_complexity":20.0,"rate_limit_clarity":0.0,"tls_enforcement":20.0,"auth_strength":10.0,"scope_granularity":20.0,"dependency_hygiene":55.0,"secret_handling":60.0,"security_notes":"Security posture appears weak from the provided README alone: no authentication/authorization is documented for MCP tools (including 'fire'), and no explicit transport security (TLS) or access controls are described. Physical actuation increases risk; strong operator confirmation and network isolation are recommended. Dependency hygiene cannot be fully assessed from README, so a mid score is used.","uptime_documented":0.0,"version_stability":40.0,"breaking_changes_history":50.0,"error_recovery":30.0,"idempotency_support":"false","idempotency_notes":null,"pagination_style":"none","retry_guidance_documented":false,"known_agent_gotchas":["Firing is a destructive action; an agent may call tools unexpectedly unless tool permissions/guardrails are enforced in the MCP client or surrounding infrastructure.","Tool parameter bounds are mentioned (0-180) but the README does not confirm how out-of-range inputs are handled.","Default serial port (/dev/ttyUSB0) may not match the deployment; misconfiguration could cause failures.","Serial hardware behavior (latency, busy states) may require additional timing/retry logic not described in the README."]}}