{"id":"disler-nano-agent","name":"nano-agent","homepage":null,"repo_url":"https://github.com/disler/nano-agent","category":"devtools","subcategories":[],"tags":["mcp","agentic","file-operations","llm","ollama","python","benchmarking"],"what_it_does":"nano-agent is an MCP server that exposes a small set of file-system tools to agent clients, and provides a CLI for running agent workflows across multiple LLM providers (OpenAI, Anthropic, and local Ollama models). It is designed to support “nested” agent execution (MCP client/outer agent calls a single MCP tool, which orchestrates internal agent/tool usage).","use_cases":["Delegating small-scale engineering tasks to an MCP-capable client (e.g., Claude Code)","Autonomous local file operations for code/test scaffolding (read/list/write/edit/get file info)","Benchmarking/evaluating agentic workflows across multiple model providers and local models","Performance/speed/cost comparison experiments using a higher-order prompt (HOP) and lower-order prompt (LOP) setup"],"not_for":["Production-grade, enterprise multi-tenant deployments without additional security hardening","High-assurance environments requiring strict isolation of filesystem access or auditing guarantees","Public internet exposure without careful network/process sandboxing","Use as a general-purpose web/API service for external users"],"best_when":"You want an MCP tool-backed agent workflow for local or controlled environments where file operations are acceptable, and you need multi-provider model switching and evaluation tooling.","avoid_when":"You need a stable, documented HTTP/REST API for third-party integration, or you require strict secret isolation/auditable policy enforcement around filesystem access.","alternatives":["Custom MCP servers built around the same file tools (read/list/write/edit) with your own policy/sandboxing","LangGraph/LangChain agent tool stacks with explicit tool schemas and guardrails","OpenAI/Anthropic native agent/tool frameworks without MCP, depending on the target client"],"af_score":51.8,"security_score":37.8,"reliability_score":35.0,"package_type":"mcp_server","discovery_source":["github"],"priority":"high","status":"evaluated","version_evaluated":null,"last_evaluated":"2026-03-30T13:37:57.136503+00:00","interface":{"has_rest_api":false,"has_graphql":false,"has_grpc":false,"has_mcp_server":true,"mcp_server_url":null,"has_sdk":false,"sdk_languages":[],"openapi_spec_url":null,"webhooks":false},"auth":{"methods":["Environment variables for provider API keys (OPENAI_API_KEY, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY) as described in README","Local Ollama usage via local service (ollama) without cloud API key mentioned"],"oauth":false,"scopes":false,"notes":"Auth model is per-provider via environment variables. The README does not describe fine-grained auth scopes for the MCP server itself; access is essentially local-process/command execution plus provider credentials."},"pricing":{"model":null,"free_tier_exists":false,"free_tier_limits":null,"paid_tiers":[],"requires_credit_card":false,"estimated_workload_costs":null,"notes":"There is no product pricing listed; costs depend on which external LLM provider(s) are used and on token usage. Local Ollama models can reduce marginal costs."},"requirements":{"requires_signup":false,"requires_credit_card":false,"domain_verification":false,"data_residency":[],"compliance":[],"min_contract":null},"agent_readiness":{"af_score":51.8,"security_score":37.8,"reliability_score":35.0,"mcp_server_quality":60.0,"documentation_accuracy":65.0,"error_message_quality":0.0,"error_message_notes":null,"auth_complexity":80.0,"rate_limit_clarity":0.0,"tls_enforcement":20.0,"auth_strength":45.0,"scope_granularity":20.0,"dependency_hygiene":50.0,"secret_handling":55.0,"security_notes":"The README suggests using environment variables and a .env sample for API keys. However, there is no discussion of TLS/network transport for MCP (it’s stdin/stdout MCP), no MCP auth/authZ model, no scope granularity, and no described sandboxing or filesystem permission restrictions. Because the server performs filesystem read/write/edit operations, misuse or overly broad path access could be a key risk in untrusted agent contexts.","uptime_documented":0.0,"version_stability":55.0,"breaking_changes_history":50.0,"error_recovery":35.0,"idempotency_support":"false","idempotency_notes":"Some tools (write_file/edit_file) appear to be non-idempotent or order-dependent because they create/overwrite/edit files; no explicit idempotency guidance is provided.","pagination_style":"none","retry_guidance_documented":false,"known_agent_gotchas":["File operations require correct paths and can overwrite existing content (especially write_file/edit_file).","When using local Ollama models, the model must be pulled/available in the Ollama environment before running.","Provider selection may depend on model naming/provider auto-detection; mis-specified provider/model names could lead to failures.","Security expectations around filesystem access/sandboxing are not described in the README."]}}