{"id":"acuvity-mcp-server-aws-terraform","name":"mcp-server-aws-terraform","homepage":"https://hub.docker.com/r/acuvity/mcp-server-aws-terraform","repo_url":"https://hub.docker.com/r/acuvity/mcp-server-aws-terraform","category":"infrastructure","subcategories":[],"tags":["mcp","aws","terraform","infrastructure-automation","agent-tools","devtools"],"what_it_does":"An MCP server that helps an agent work with AWS and Terraform-related workflows by exposing tools for tasks such as Terraform configuration/plan/apply and AWS resource interactions (exact tool list not provided in the prompt).","use_cases":["Enable an LLM/MCP agent to assist with AWS infrastructure tasks using Terraform","Generate or validate Terraform configurations and modules","Guide or automate AWS resource provisioning workflows (plan/apply) with guardrails via agent-invoked tools","Assist with migration or refactoring efforts involving Terraform and AWS"],"not_for":["Running untrusted or high-privilege Terraform changes without human review","Handling sensitive AWS secrets exposure in prompts or logs","Acting as a fully autonomous deployment system without policy enforcement","Standalone Terraform execution without understanding AWS auth/permissions"],"best_when":"You have an MCP-capable agent and want infrastructure assistance centered on AWS + Terraform, with appropriate AWS credentials and review/approval gates.","avoid_when":"You cannot provide least-privilege AWS credentials, or you require strict audit/policy controls beyond what the MCP server documents/enforces.","alternatives":["Direct Terraform CLI + IAM roles (human-in-the-loop)","Other Terraform/AWS automation tools with explicit CI/CD workflows","A dedicated Terraform plan/apply automation service integrated into your pipeline","General cloud SDK/CLI tools invoked directly by the agent (with strict guardrails)"],"af_score":44.0,"security_score":47.8,"reliability_score":26.2,"package_type":"mcp_server","discovery_source":["docker_mcp"],"priority":"low","status":"evaluated","version_evaluated":null,"last_evaluated":"2026-04-04T21:34:53.777753+00:00","interface":{"has_rest_api":false,"has_graphql":false,"has_grpc":false,"has_mcp_server":true,"mcp_server_url":null,"has_sdk":false,"sdk_languages":[],"openapi_spec_url":null,"webhooks":false},"auth":{"methods":["AWS IAM credentials (e.g., access key/secret, or assumed role via environment)"],"oauth":false,"scopes":false,"notes":"No authentication specifics were included in the provided prompt; scoring assumes typical AWS credential handling for such an MCP server."},"pricing":{"model":null,"free_tier_exists":false,"free_tier_limits":null,"paid_tiers":[],"requires_credit_card":false,"estimated_workload_costs":null,"notes":"No pricing information provided; as an MCP server, cost is likely self-hosting/infrastructure dependent."},"requirements":{"requires_signup":false,"requires_credit_card":false,"domain_verification":false,"data_residency":[],"compliance":[],"min_contract":null},"agent_readiness":{"af_score":44.0,"security_score":47.8,"reliability_score":26.2,"mcp_server_quality":60.0,"documentation_accuracy":40.0,"error_message_quality":0.0,"error_message_notes":null,"auth_complexity":45.0,"rate_limit_clarity":20.0,"tls_enforcement":60.0,"auth_strength":55.0,"scope_granularity":35.0,"dependency_hygiene":40.0,"secret_handling":45.0,"security_notes":"Security posture cannot be verified from the prompt. Typical risks: over-privileged AWS credentials, accidental leakage of secrets via logs, and agent-initiated Terraform changes. Least-privilege IAM roles and redaction of secrets should be ensured. TLS depends on how the MCP transport is configured (self-hosting).","uptime_documented":0.0,"version_stability":40.0,"breaking_changes_history":30.0,"error_recovery":35.0,"idempotency_support":"false","idempotency_notes":null,"pagination_style":"none","retry_guidance_documented":false,"known_agent_gotchas":["Terraform apply operations are not automatically idempotent across all workflows—ensure safe re-runs and state management","AWS permissions mistakes can lead to partial failure; least-privilege and explicit role/session scoping matter","Agents may attempt unsafe apply without review; ensure policy/approval steps in the surrounding agent workflow"]}}